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The possibility of an international commodity agreement on pe-
troleum has been discussed by various authors in recent years.' This
article examines the possibility of such an agreement, first, by briefly
setting forth the reasons why both petroleum-exporting and
petroleum-importing countries should cooperate in determining the
future structure of the world petroleum industry; second, by survey-
ing the principal provisions of five of the most recent international
commodity agreements so as to determine what precedents exist
which would be applicable to a hypothetical agreement on petroleum;
and third, by suggesting the form that such an agreement might
take.2
II. REASONS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN EXPORTERS AND IMPORTERS
On October 16, 1973, the six largest petroleum-exporting coun-
tries on the Persian Gulf-Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Iraq, Abu
Dhabi and Kuwait-announced a 17 percent increase in the price of
their crude petroleum.3 This step, which was a landmark in that it
represented the first time that petroleZIm-exporting countries unilat-
erally raised the price of their product, was followed on December 24,
1973 by another price hike, effective January 1, 1974, which was
substantially larger than the preceeding one.' The net effect of these
* B.A., Yale College, 1973; J.D. candidate, Yale Law School; Marshall Scholar,
Wadham College, Oxford.
1. See, e.g., Amuzegar, The Oil Story: Facts, Fiction, and Fair Play, 51 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 676 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Amuzegar].
2. This article does not cover the history, or the economic pros and cons, of
international commodity agreements, which have been amply discussed elsewhere.
See, e.g., J. ROWE, PRIMARY COMMODITIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1965) [hereinafter
cited as RoWE]; W. HAVILAND, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS (1963)
[hereinafter cited as HAVILAND]; M. RADETZKI, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY MARKET
ARRANGEMENTS (1970); E. MASON, CONTROLLING WORLD TRADE (1946); Hager,
Commodity Agreements and the Developing Countries: A Collective Bargaining
Approach, 7 INT'L LAW. 309 (1973); H. JOHNSON, ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1967); A. MACBEAN, EXPORT INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (1966) [hereinafter cited as MACBEAN]; J. PINCUS, TRADE, AID AND
DEVELOPMENT (1967); Pincus, Commodity Agreements: Bonanza or Illusion?, 2 COLUM.
J. OF WORLD Bus. 41 (1967); INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COM-
MODITY AGREEMENTS (1943); L. BARANYAI & MILLS, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY
AGREEMENTS (1963); U.N. Doc. TD/97, vol. II (1968); U.N. Doc. TD/180, vol. I (1972);
C. BLAU, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY ARRANGEMENTS AND POLICIES (FAO Commodity
Policy Study No. 16, 1964).
3. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1973, at 16, col. 1.
4. N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
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two price increases was to raise the price of Arabian Light Crude Oil
for purposes of taxes and royalties to $11.65 a barrel, compared with
a cost in 1970 of $1.80 a barrel.
5
The six Persian Gulf states are members of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),' along with Algeria, Indone-
sia, Ecuador, Libya, Nigeria, Venezuela and Gabon. The other mem-
bers of OPEC soon followed the lead of the Persian Gulf countries and
raised their petroleum prices accordingly;7 since January 1974, mem-
bers of OPEC have on three occasions either collectively or individu-
ally modified the effective price of the petroleum they export.'
The petroleum price increases of 1974 have had severe effects on
the world economy: they have thrust several developed and many
developing countries into virtually unmanageable balance-of-
payments deficits; 9 they have placed a severe strain on international
money markets; 0 and they have raised the spectre of a major world
5. N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1973, at 31, col. 7.
6. OPEC was created in 1960 as an immediate response to a petroleum price cut
imposed by the international oil companies. E. PENROSE, THE LARGE INTERNATIONAL
FIRM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 200 (1968).
For a history and an analysis of this organization see Z. MIKDASHI, THE COMMUNITY OF
OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES (1972) [hereinafter cited as MIKDASHI].
7. Venezuela, for example, followed suit within days. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1973,
§ 4, at 1, col. 1.
8. The general impact of these modifications has been to raise the effective price
of petroleum. The four occasions referred to are (a) in June 1974, the member countries
raised by two percent the royalty payments due from the oil companies. N.Y. Times,
June 18, 1974, at 1, col. 3; (b) in September 1974, the tax due from the companies was
raised another three-and-one-half percent. ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1974, at 101; (c) in
November 1974, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar reduced the
"posted price" (discussed at note 146, infra) of their petroleum while off-setting the
move by increasing oil company taxes. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1974, at 1, col. 8; (d)
finally, in December 1974, the OPEC members established a new level of government
revenues about 38 cents a barrel above the level adopted in September. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 14, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
9. The underdeveloped countries have been hardest hit: "There is a hard core of
about forty seriously troubled nations mostly in tropical Africa, south Asia, and the
Central-American-Caribbean area. For these nations the price increases are a blow
that could mean increased poverty and famine unless extraordinary measures are
taken to assist them." N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1974, § 3, at 3, col. 2.
10. While concern over the unmanageability of the vast amounts of money being
transferred from the petroleum-importers to the exporters has decreased in recent
months as a result of new figures indicating that the build-up of petrodollars in the
exporting countries will be less than originally estimated after the sharp increase in
the price of petroleum, Henry Wallich, a member of the United States Federal Reserve
Board, may have best articulated the feelings of many economists when he said, while
addressing a banking conference in Singapore in January 1975: "In recent months a
feeling has gained ground, I believe, that under present conditions the problem may
turn out to be manageable in a broad sense. Nobody, I believe, can be completely sure
of this either way." N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1975, at 42, col. 6.
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recession or depression." Three factors explain these impacts. First,
the present world economy is energy-dependent. Second, petroleum
is the primary source of energy.2 Third, the known and/or currently
available reserves of petroleum are concentrated in a handful of coun-
tries, virtually all of which are members of OPEC."
The events of 1974 mark the breakdown of a world system of
petroleum production and distribution that dates back to the 19th
century. 4 That system relied on the international oil companies,
eight of whom controlled 80 percent of the world crude petroleum
trade as recently as 1970,'1 to make most of the crucial decisions
involved in the world petroleum process: how much petroleum should
be produced, what constitutes a fair price for it, how should it be
distributed to consumers. The breakdown of the system has been the
result of, and has concomitantly accelerated, a decrease in signifi-
cance of the role played by the international oil companies in the
world petroleum process. As Walter Levy writes:
Thus, the companies no longer possess any real leverage. About the only
role that is, in effect, left to them in established producing areas is that
of a contractor providing technical services, getting in return some
11. Id., Aug. 18, 1974, § 3, at 12, col. 1.
12. From 1960-70, petroleum increased its share of world energy consumption
among the various primary fuels from 33 percent to 44 percent, surpassing coal as the
major world fuel. OECD, OIL: THE PRESENT SITUATION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 33 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as OECD]. Prior to the abrupt price increases of late 1973 and early
1974, petroleum was expected to claim some 48 percent, or nearly twice as much as
its closest competitor, coal, of the projected world energy consumption for 1980. Id.,
at 14. World consumption of petroleum was expected to increase from its 1973 level of
some 50 million barrels a day to some 80 million barrels a day. Id. While these projec-
tions may have to be revised downward as a result of the enormous price increases of
the past year, the preeminence of petroleum among primary fuels in the next decade
seems assured, largely because of the problems surrounding the development and use
of alternative fuels. Thus, for example, within the United States serious questions have
arisen as to the safety of nuclear energy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, § 3, at 1, col. 1;
shale development has failed to catch fire as expected, Id., Nov. 3, 1974, § 3, at 2, col.
5; and environmentalists have announced their opposition to the development of coal
reserves in Western states. Id., Jan. 5, 1975, § 3, part I, at 45, col. 4. For an analysis
of the short-term possibilities for the various alternative energy sources in terms of
United States self-sufficiency see the entire issue of TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, May 1974.
13. Levy, World Oil Cooperation or International Chaos, 52 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 690
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Levy].
14. The history of that system is set forth in E. PENROSE, THE LARGE INTERNA-
TIONAL FIRM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 53
(1968). The disintegration of the system, which had begun to become apparent by the
mid-1960's, was due to various factors, the most prominent of which were: (1) increased
competition in the international petroleum market as the result of the entrance of 20
to 30 smaller international oil firms and of the creation of state-owned oil companies;
and (2) the birth and infancy of OPEC. MIKDASHI, supra note 6, at 46.
15. Levy, supra note 13, at 693.
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privileged access to oil-at costs and prices determined by the producing
governments. The extent of even this "privilege" and the time over which
it will be available are subject to unilateral cancellations at any moment,
as were all preceding arrangements."
The decline of the oil companies has created a void in the world
petroleum process that must be filled by the petroleum-exporting and
-importing nations. These nations may act unilaterally or coopera-
tively toward that end. Recent months, however, have witnessed a
perceptible shift toward an accomodation between the exporting and
importing nations, as evidenced by both groups' acquiescence to and
participation in an international petroleum conference, held in Sep-
tember 1975.'1
There are three principal reasons why it is in the exporting na-
tions' interest to cooperate with the importing countries in determin-
ing the future structure of the world petroleum industry. First, while
the remarkable cohesion demonstrated by the members of OPEC has
permitted them to dominate the world petroleum market for the past
two years, there is no certainty that either that cohesion or that
dominance will persist, for the pressure on the cartel due to decreased
world petroleum consumption that has already caused some divisions
within the OPEC bloc, 8 could well increase in future years as a result
of an effort by importing nations to reduce consumption and develop
new energy sources." It could thus be in the interest of the exporters
to minimize the risk of eventually losing market control by sharing
that control with the importers while the exporters are still in a posi-
tion to drive a hard bargain.
Second, there are certain facets of the world petroleum industry
in which the exporting nations have an interest-including regulation
of international oil company behavior, access to import markets for
refined petroleum products, and adoption of energy conservation
16. Id.
17. For a report see TIME, Sept. 22, 1975, at 16.
18. The divisions have been in the form of price-shaving by individual OPEC
members, which occurred with some frequency in the early months of 1975. See, e.g.,
Wall St. Journal, Feb. 28, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
19. Importing nations have acted both individually and in concert to reduce petro-
leum consumption and develop new energy sources. Thus, in addition to measures
adopted individually by countries such as France (N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1974, at 1, col.
7) and Italy (N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1975, at 3, col. 5), the major importers have agreed
through the International Energy Agency to a plan aimed at reducing their petroleum
consumption by two million barrels a day, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1975, at 1, col. 5. In
addition, the importers have agreed to increase energy investments and production.
Id. And, of course, the past year has witnessed the discovery of major petroleum fields
in Mexico, off Brazil, and in the Irish Sea, as well as the accelerated development of
deposits in the North Sea and in Alaska. Yergin, The Economic, Military, and Political
Solution, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 16, 1975, at 10.
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measures-which, since they do not lend themselves to unilateral
determination by exporters or importers, are best approached cooper-
atively.
Third, it is in the exporters' interest to not antagonize or weaken
the importing nations any further than is necessary, both because the
two groups are inherently interdependent-the exporters need mar-
kets for their petroleum, capital and non-capital goods for their devel-
opment, and stable economies to provide investment opportunities
for the vast amounts of money that the exporters are amassing-and
because the possibility of a military confrontation between exporters
and importers remains a real possibility. 0
The importing nations also have valid reasons for cooperation
with the exporters. First, although the major importing countries
have been busy over the past years designing a common strategy,
there have been sharp disagreements as to what that policy should
be.2' Furthermore, even if the major importers were to succeed in
presenting a common front, there is no certainty that they would
obtain control of the world petroleum process from the exporters.
Consequently, it is in the importers' interest to assure themselves a
voice in the industry's future through cooperation with the exporters.
Second, like the exporting countries, the importers have interests in
various facets of the oil industry, such as the regulation of interna-
tional oil company behavior and access to import markets for refined
petroleum products, which can best be controlled through coopera-
tion between exporters and importers. Finally, since the importers
need the exporters' petroleum, they should avoid antagonizing the
exporters any more than is absolutely necessary. Moreover, while the
importers would "win" a military confrontation with the exporters,
the victory, in terms of the psychological costs to the victors and the
possibility of escalation of the confrontation into a nuclear holocaust,
might well be Pyrrhic.
III. THE COMMODITY AGREEMENT AS A MODE OF COOPERATION
A. Definition
An international commodity agreement has been defined as "an
association of the governments of more than two countries for the
20. The matter was of sufficient concern to OPEC members to warrant discussion
at the meeting of OPEC Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Petroleum and Finance
in Algiers in January 1975. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1975, at 8, col. 4.
21. Among the disagreements are: (1) Norway, which expects to become an oil
exporter in the near future, has refused to join the International Energy Agency created
by the major importing nations. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1973, at 9, col. 1. (2) France
has also refused to join the International Energy Agency. The French are reluctant to
take any steps that the exporters might perceive as hostile. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1974,
at 71, col. 6.
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purpose of regulating the marketing of some primary product in the
interest of exporters and importers."" Such an agreement has several
outstanding characteristics. First, in that it seeks to supplement or
replace the free market mechanism, such an agreement is "funda-
mentally [a] form of monopolistictic combination of the cartel
type. ' 23 Second, the agreement is contracted to by governments, not
"by private (or 'public commercial') enterprises.""4 Third, the agree-
ment is multilateral, in that both importing and exporting countries
participate."5 Fourth, the agreement is in treaty form." Fifth, the
agreement only applies to international trade in primary products or
primary commodities.27 Finally, the agreement attempts to deal com-
prehensively with trade of a certain commodity, by creating an ad-
ministrative structure to supervise the trade, establish a system of
conflict resolution, and impose reciprocal obligations upon members,
often including supply commitments.
B. Structural Components of International Commodity Agreements
1. Types of Agreements
There are three types of international commodity agreements:
export quota agreements, buffer stock agreements, and multilateral
contract agreements.
22. HAVILAND, supra note 2, at 9.
23. ROWE, supra note 2, at 121.
24. Walker, The International Law of Commodity Agreements, 28 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 392 (1963).
25. While international commodity agreements have their genesis in agreements
between exporters' groups, or between exporting countries, and while exporters' agree-
ments have a long history in which they have governed a substantial part of world trade
(see E. HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (1946)), the term "international commodity
agreement" has since World War II come to denote agreements involving both export-
ing and importing countries.
26. That is, they conform to the definition of a "treaty" as found in art. 2 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: "1. For the purposes of the present
Convention: a) 'treaty' means an international agreement concluded between States
in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designa-
tion; .... " U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, May 23, 1969.
27. These terms are used interchangeably in this paper, as they appear to be
throughout the field of commodity agreements. Art. 56 of the Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization, the seminal document for post-World War II
commodity agreements, ROWE, supra, note 2, at 158-59, defines a primary commodity
as: (1) "any product of farm, forest or fishery or any mineral, in its natural form or
which has undergone such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for mar-
keting in substantial volume in international trade;" or (2) "a group of commodities
of which one is a primary commodity . . . which are so closely related, as regards
conditions of production or utilization, to the other commodities in the group, that it
is appropriate to deal with them in a single agreement." Not included in the definition
of "international commodity agreements," however, are those agreements "relating
solely to the conservation of fisheries resources, migratory birds, or wild animals." Art.
70(d) of the Havana Charter.
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a. Export Quota Agreements
The oldest of the three types is the export quota agreement, such
as the International Coffee Agreement of 1968,11 the International
Sugar Agreement of 1968,29 and the International Cocoa Agreement
of 1972. 30 Under this type of agreement, the overall quantity of ex-
ports allowed on the world market is fixed at a level which will satisfy
demand at prices agreed upon by the members. Individual country
export quotas are then established to conform to the desired overall
quantity.
3'
There are several important considerations involved in the de-
sign and operation of export quota agreements. The first is that these
agreements are based on projections of future world production and
consumption, as well as the behavior of prices. Such projections are
not always accurate. Accurate prediction is particularly difficult
28. The International Coffee Agreement, 1968, opened for signature February 19,
1968, 19 U.S.T. 6333, T.I.A.S. No. 6584, 647 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as Coffee
Agreement]. For the text of the Agreement, see International Coffee Agreement, 7
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 237 (1968).
29. The International Sugar Agreement of 1968, -U.N.T.S.- [hereinafter
cited as Sugar Agreement]. For text of the Agreement see U.N. Doc. TD/Sugar, 7/12
(1968). While another agreement was concluded in 1973, the later agreement did not
seek to control the world sugar trade, but merely to provide a forum for communication
and for the gathering of information on the world sugar trade. As a result, no export
limitations were placed on members, rendering the 1973 Agreement less useful for the
purposes of analysis than the 1968 Agreement. Consequently only the 1968 Agreement
will be discussed here. For the text of the 1973 Sugar Agreement, see U.N. Doc.
TD/Sugar, 8/6 (1973).
30. The International Cocoa Agreement, 1972, opened for signature November 15,
1972, __U.N.T.S.. [hereinafter cited as Cocoa Agreement]. For the text of the
Agreement see U.N. Doc. TD/Cocoa, 3/9 (1972). While the Cocoa Agreement is a
hybrid agreement, combining both export quotas and a buffer stock, its primary reli-
ance is on export quotas. See note 47, infra.
31. Faucett, The Function of Law in International Commodity Agreements, 44
BRIT. YR. BK. OF INT'L LAW 157, 172 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Faucett]. It should
be noted that importing country members have, in the past, not been obliged under
this type of agreement to purchase the commodity governed by the agreement at a
fixed price; indeed, historically, and with the exception of the Sugar Agreement, im-
porting countries have not been required to purchase any amount of the commodity
at all, for export quota agreements do not establish a direct relationship between
exporting members' exports and importing members' imports. However, the Sugar
Agreement did contain some novel, albeit moderate, commitments on the part of
certain importing nations to import a minimum amount of sugar annually. See Annex
A of the Sugar Agreement, and U.N. Doc. TD/180, vol. II, at 20, para. 46 (1972).
Member countries may decide to exclude certain exports from the computation
of a member's quota under the agreement. Thus, for example, the Coffee Agreement,
in an effort to increase consumption of coffee in certain countries, excludes exports to
those countries from compilation towards the exporting members' quotas. Art. 40 of
the Coffee Agreement.
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where production of the commodity will fluctuate, depending upon
unpredictable variables, such as changes in weather.
Second, export quota agreements are ineffective unless a high
proportion of world trade in that commodity is covered by the agree-
ment; otherwise, control over market behavior is impossible. A corol-
lary is that if there are important exporters or importers absent from
the agreement, then trade in the commodity between members and
non-members will have to be regulated if confrontation is to be
avoided. Two alternative methods have been developed to limit trade
between members and non-members. The first of these methods re-
quires that members of the agreement not deal with non-members on
terms that are "commercially more favorable" than those established
in the agreement.32 The second limits the quantity that a member
may import from non-members to the amount the member imported
from the non-member in a fixed, antecedent period. 3 In addition, in
order to enforce these restrictions, as well as to provide the adminis-
tering organization with accurate information as to flows of the com-
modity, export quota agreements have been devised to include an
elaborate mechanism involving certificates of origin and re-export for
all exports made by members.
A third consideration is that the negotiation of export quotas is
often an arduous process, as each exporting member desires a low
total quantity while obtaining as large a quota for its own exports as
possible.3 5 The matter is further complicated by the disputability of
the projections on which the quotas are based. Given the difficulties
inherent in the process of allocating export quotas, it is not surprising
that the quotas usually end up being determined on the basis of
historical market shares. 6
Fourth, the difficulties of agreeing on a price level are also great.
While these difficulties are present regardless of what type of agree-
ment is negotiated, they are particularly acute in the case of an
32. See, e.g., art. 55(1), (2) of the Cocoa Agreement.
33. See, e.g., art. 45 of the Coffee Agreement, which states: (1) "To prevent non-
member exporting countries from increasing their exports at the expense of Members,
each Member shall limit its annual imports of coffee produced in non-member export-
ing countries to a quantity not in excess of the average annual imports of coffee from
those countries during the calendar years 1960, 1961 and 1962." See also art. 54 of the
Cocoa Agreement.
Given participation by all but one or two major importing or exporting countries,
the optimum provision in terms of inducing these recalcitrant countries to join and
thus facilitating the operation of the agreement would be one which forbade altogether
member-non-member trade in the commodity governed.
34. See, e.g., art. 43 of the Coffee Agreement.
35. MAcBEAN, supra note 2, at 274.
36. Id., at 273.
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export quota agreement because this type of agreement provides flex-
ibility as to price. Thus, an export quota agreement may be utilized
to raise prices (by restricting supply at a level beneath demand), to
lower prices (by raising supply above demand to the extent possible),
or to stabilize prices (by placing supply and demand in equilibrium).
While this price flexibility may induce discord among members, it is
also the most attractive quality of export quota agreements, for it
makes them powerful vehicles whether the objective of the agreement
is price stability or price support.
37
b. Buffer Stock Agreements
The second type of commodity scheme is the buffer stock agree-
ment, such as the Fourth International Tin Agreement of 1970.
3
1
These agreements operate by creating an agency, endowed with a
stock of the commodity and/or money, which is empowered to inter-
vene to maintain the price of the commodity within a fixed range
through purchases and sales in the world commodity market. When
prices fall below the lower limit (or floor), the agency buys excess
supplies of the commodity at a floor price established within the
agreement. Assuming that the agency has sufficient funds, prices can
be held at the floor by means of the agency's purchases. If the price
rises above the upper limit (or ceiling), the agency sells the commod-
ity which it holds in stock at the ceiling prices established in the
agreement, and so long as the agency's stocks last, the price can be
held at or below the ceiling.
Buffer stock agreements are the most widely advocated measures
for stabilizing commodity markets," largely because of three inherent
advantages: (1) the buffer stock acts directly, and with immediate
effect, on the commodity concerned; 0 the stock has an immediate
market impact, thus allowing quick and precise adjustments; (2) the
buffer stock agreement "avoids the difficult practical problems,
37. As used in this article, the term "price support" implies interference with the
free market mechanism to raise the price of a commodity above the point representing
long-term equilibrium between supply and demand and to maintain them at that
level. In contrast, "price stability" represents an attempt to minimize periodic, short-
term fluctuations in the price of a commodity without raising that price above the long-
term equilibrium point.
38. The Fourth International Tin Agreement, 1970, opened for signature July 1,
1970, .U.N.T.S . [hereinafter cited as Tin Agreement]. For the text of the
Agreement see U.N. Doc. TD/TIN. 4/7/Rev. 1 (1970). While the Tin Agreement is a
hybrid agreement, combining the use of both a buffer stock and export quotas, it relies
primarily on the buffer stock.
39. MACBEAN, supra note 2, at 269.
40. U.N. Doc. TD/97, vol. I, at 25, para. 147 (1968). Whereas in many primary
industries export quota schemes are not a viable alternative because quantitative
control of output cannot cooperate with sufficient velocity to meet changes in demand.
RowE, supra note 2, at 189.
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which arise in export quota schemes, of ensuring that all important
importing and/or exporting countries participate and that they agree
on the allocation of quotas;"' and (3) since a buffer stock agreement
only requires an exporting member to commit a part of its production
to the agreement, while leaving the member free to dispose of the
remainder as it sees fit, this type of agreement may be politically less
objectionable than an export quota agreement, which subjects the
member's entire production to a form of international supervision.
Like export quota agreements, buffer stock agreements also have
inherent limitations and disadvantages: (1) the management of a
buffer stock is an extremely difficult task requiring a level of expertise
that cannot always be attained; 42 (2) buffer stock agreements are not
appropriate for several types of commodities, such as those which
cannot be stored for some length of time, those which, because of
some intrinsic characteristic, such as bulk, can only be stored at great
expense, 3 and those marked by a lack of homogeneity, both as to
grades (or types) of the commodity and/or as to the prices at which
they are available on major world markets;" and (3) buffer stock
agreements have as their primary objective price stability, not price
support. These agreements do not seek to alter the long-term equilib-
rium of supply and demand, but rather attempt to smooth temporary
price fluctuations.
45
The 1960's and 1970's have witnessed the adoption of commodity
agreements which combined the use of export quotas and buffer
stocks. 41 In these agreements special attention is given to the respec-
tive roles of the two devices in achieving the desired objective.4 7 The
41. U.N. Doc. TD/97, vol. II, at 25, para. 147 (1968). Thus, while it is desirable
that as many exporting and importing countries as possible participate in the agree-
ment, in that all importing and exporting countries, whether members or not, will
benefit from the stability that the buffer stock agreement will bring to the world
market, the refusal of a significant exporter or importer to participate may not impede
the conclusion of the Agreement, but will only signify that members will have to
shoulder proportionally greater obligations than would otherwise have been true.
42. RoWE, supra note 2, at 194.
43. Id., at 191.
44. If there are numerous types (or grades) of a commodity, stocks may have to
be kept for each. Not only may coordination of the different stocks prove difficult, but
agreement might have to be reached separately for each type of commodity as to such
questions as the guidelines for contribution to the stock by member countries and the
price range which will govern the agreement. Id.
45. Only those agreements which, like export quota agreements, manipulate
members' production and exports can successfully alter the long-term equilibrium
between supply and demand. For a buffer stock to alter this equilibrium without
controlling members' production its resources might well have to be enormous.
46. I.e., the Tin Agreement and the Cocoa Agreement.
47. The Tin and Cocoa Agreements represent two different approaches in that the
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advantage of combining the two methods lies in the increased flexi-
bility that such a combination provides. Thus, the availability of a
buffer stock to complement export quotas means that the projections
as to world supply and demand upon which the quotas were based
need not be as accurate as they would have to be in an agreement
relying exclusively on export quotas. The buffer stock can purchase
any excess supply, or dispose of its own resources in case of excess
demand, in order to keep prices within the agreed range. Similarly,
the presence of quota restrictions on member countries' exports
means that the buffer stock's resources will not have to be as large
as would otherwise have been true, for in times of excess supply or
demand the organization can adjust members' exports, rather than
intervening in the market through the stock.
c. Multilateral Contract Agreements
The third type of international commodity agreement is the mul-
tilateral contract agreement. Under this scheme importer nations
agree to purchase all or a stated portion of their imports from exporter
members, and the exporters agree to supply the quantities agreed
upon within a stated price range. Thus, in a time of shortage the
exporters may not raise prices above the maximum stipulated in the
agreement, and in a time of surplus importers must purchase the pre-
determined amount at a price not less than the minimum written into
the scheme. As long as world prices fluctuate within the established
range, however, the price mechanism of the agreement does not come
into play and sales and purchases are at market prices.
The multilateral contract agreement represents a major post-war
innovation in the technique of international commodity agreements.
This type of agreement was introduced in the 1949 Wheat Agreement
and has continued to be used by successive wheat schemes,5 although
former of these relies primarily on the buffer stock, while only imposing export quota
restrictions when supply exceeds a pre-determined point, (arts. 33, 34 of the Tin
Agreement); the latter relies primarily on the export quotas while viewing the buffer
stock as a supplementary vehicle for the stabilization of the market acting both
through direct intervention in the market and as a buyer to which members may sell
their excess production at reduced prices. Articles 37-40 of the Cocoa Agreement.
48. Most recently in the Wheat Trade Convention of 1967, 19 U.S.T. 5501,
T.I.A.S. No. 6537 (hereinafter cited as the Wheat Trade Convention], which, together
with the Food Aid Convention of 1967, 19 U.S.T. 5772, T.I.A.S. No. 6537, formed the
International Grains Arrangement of 1967. For an analysis of this treaty see Note,
Commodity Price-Fixing: the International Grains Arrangement of 1967, 23 STAN. L.
REV. 306 (1971). Both of the conventions were re-enacted in 1971. Wheat Trade Con-
vention of 1971, 22 U.S.T. 820, T.I.A.S. No. 7144, and Food Aid Convention of 1971,
22 U.S.T. 971, T.I.A.S. No. 7144. However, the Wheat Trade Convention of 1971,
unlike its predecessor, contained no price provisions or related rights and obligations.
Hence, the references made in this article will be to the Wheat Trade Convention of
1967.
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it has not been adopted for other commodities. The probable reason
for this omission is that unlike export quota and buffer stock
schemes, the multilateral contract agreement is not designed to gov-
ern all of the world trade in a commodity, nor even all of the member
countries' trade. Instead, the multilateral contract agreement repre-
sents a form of mutual insurance between exporter and importer
members. Thus, neither production nor exports are controlled, and a
free market remains where prices can evince long-term tendencies in
supply and demand."
2. Common Aspects of the Agreements
a. Participation
Commodity agreements go beyond the principle of equal repre-
sentation for importers and exporters and open participation for a
broad spectrum of countries.- In order to encourage universal partici-
pation, the agreements uniformly include a provision permitting ac-
cession by member governments of the United Nations or of its spe-
cialized agencies on terms to be established by the organization in
conjunction with the petitioning government.5 No appeal from these
terms is provided. 5
All of the agreements also permit the voluntary withdrawal of
members, but there is less uniformity than is true of accession provi-
49. MACBEAN, supra note 2, at 286.
50. The agreements all encompass a politically and economically diverse group of
nations. The Cocoa Agreement, for example, includes the United States, the Soviet
Union, New Hebrides, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Poland. See Annexes A, B, C,
D of the Cocoa Agreement.
51. See, e.g., art. 64 of the Sugar Agreement.
52. While the stipulation that conditions for accession be agreed upon by the
Council and the acceding party would seem to imply equitable terms, this conclusion
has been questioned: "A newly developing area, while always having the strength of a
potential competitor which might undermine the basis of the scheme, will frequently
be at an undue disadvantage in negotiation with the established interests entrenched
in the control authority." INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMOD-
rTv AGREEMENTS xlvii (1943).
To avoid any inequity that might result from such a disadvantage, the observer
recommends that "provisions for an appeal . . . to a more general international au-
thority" as to accession terms be instituted. Id. However, this recommendation was
made prior to the widespread inclusion of importers in commodity agreements, and
the architects of subsequent commodity agreements may have felt that the presence
of both importers and exporters in the agreement is sufficient to insure against any
abuse of the petitioning party. Such an assumption, does not seem warranted, for the
importing countries will not necessarily champion the cause of the developing area
against the exporting interests entrenched in the agreement. As a result, the suggestion
that acceding parties be permitted to appeal to some international authority remains
valid.
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sions. Thus, three of the agreements, Cocoa,53 Coffee,"4 and Sugar ', 5
permit withdrawal at the unilateral discretion of a member, provided
that the member gives short advance notice. The two other agree-
ments, Wheat and Tin, attempt to impose guidelines as to what
constitute valid reasons for withdrawal. These agreements provide
that a member may withdraw either for national security reasons"6 or
when an amendment to the original agreement has been enacted
which the withdrawing member believes will adversely affect its in-
terests.57 The Wheat Trade Convention also permits unilateral with-
drawal when a given country, to the prejudice of the withdrawing
member, has refused to join, or has withdrawn from, the Conven-
tion.58 Finally, the Tin Agreement allows withdrawal, but only with
the consent of the Council, in situations where the withdrawing mem-
bers have been economically damaged by another participating coun-
try.
59
The provisions allowing withdrawal at the unilateral discretion
of the withdrawing member have been criticized as being conducive
to instability of the agreements, and it has been suggested that such
withdrawal should be subject to the review of "some international
authority."60 However, only the Tin6 and Sugar82 Agreements contain
provisions calling for the participation of outside authorities in situa-
tions involving the threatened withdrawal of a member, and in nei-
ther case does the decision-making role of that authority approximate
that suggested.
Commodity agreements show their greatest flexibility in terms
of participation by nation-states. There are provisions for group
membership and for changing a member's classification from an ex-
porter to an importer, or vice-versa.
The Coffee and Wheat agreements provide for the participation
53. Art. 71 of the Cocoa Agreement.
54. Art. 66 of the Coffee Agreement.
55. Art. 67 of the Sugar Agreement. The Tin Agreement, in addition to permitting
withdrawal under the situations discussed infra, permits unilateral discretionary with-
drawal, but only if the withdrawing member provides notification one year in advance.
Art. 52(ii).
56. Art. 41(7) of the Wheat Trade Convention. As for the Tin Agreement, permis-
sion to withdraw for national security reasons seems implicit in art. 41(a)(ii) of the
Agreement.
57. Art. 41(5) of the Wheat Trade Convention and art. 51(f) of the Tin Agreement.
58. Art. 41(6) and (8) of the Wheat Trade Convention.
59. Art. 41(c) and (d) of the Tin Agreement.
60. INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS 52
(1943).
61. Art. 41(c) and (d) of the Tin Agreement.
62. Art. 69 of the Sugar Agreement.
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of member groups. The Coffee Agreement permits exporter members
to join the agreement as a group provided that they meet certain
criteria. 3 The Wheat Agreement allows the participation of the Euro-
pean Economic Community as both an importer and an exporter. 4
The Tin Agreement also contains a provision permitting a partic-
ipating country to change its category from an exporter to an im-
porter, or vice-versa. 5 The provision leaves to the Council the deci-
sion as to the new terms which will govern the country's participation
in the Agreement, stipulating only that (a) the terms be equitable,
and (b) if the change is from exporting to importing status, the
changing country retains its rights to a refund upon liquidation of the
stock."
The final aspect of participation in commodity agreements is
representation of non-state entities. Two types of provisions are made
for inter-governmental organizations. First, all of the agreements con-
tain a standard clause empowering the organization responsible for
the agreement to consult and cooperate with other inter-
governmental organizations, 7 as well as generally permitting the par-
ticipation by invitation of these organizations as observers at meet-
ings of the Council." Second, two of the agreements, Tin and Cocoa,
permit membership in the agreement, with voting rights in special
63. The provision permitting exporter group membership prior to the entry into
force of the Agreement is art. 5. The criteria to be met were: (1) The parties to the
proposed group must declare their willingness "to accept responsibility for group obli-
gations in an individual as well as a group capacity." Art. 5(1)(a). (2) The parties must
"subsequently provide sufficient evidence to the Council that the group has the organi-
zation necessary to implement a common coffee policy, and that they have the means
of complying, together with the other parties to the group, with their obligations under
the agreement." Art. 5(1)(b). (3) The parties must demonstrate either that they have
been recognized as a group in a previous international coffee agreement; or that they
have a common or co-ordinated monetary and financial policy along with the organs
necessary for the implementation of such a policy. Art. 51(c)(i) and (c)(ii)(a), (b).
If these criteria were met, the member group would be considered to constitute a
single member of the agreement for the purpose of voting and other important matters
arising under the Agreement. Art. 5(2), (3), (4). Finally, the Agreement permitted
members of such groups to withdraw and become separate members. Art. 5(5). (See
also art. 6, permitting the creation of member groups after the Agreement was in
effect.)
64. Art. 10 of the Wheat Trade Convention makes the European Economic Com-
munity a member of the Agreement "with all the rights and obligations deriving
therefrom."
65. Art. 5 of the Tin Agreement.
66. Art. 5(c)(i) and (ii). Here, as in the case of accession, a provision for appeal
to an arbitrator or other international authority from the terms established by the
Council seems advisable.
67. See, e.g., art. 21 of the Coffee Agreement.
68. Id.
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circumstances, for inter-governmental organizations "having respon-
sibilities in respect of the negotiation" of international agreements. 9
Commodity agreements provide infrequently for the participa-
tion of private organizations. As one might expect from a vehicle
which is regarded as the domain of governments, no agreement ac-
cords membership to private organizations. Only the Cocoa"0 and
Sugar7 Agreements contain clauses specifically empowering the or-
ganization responsible for the agreement to "make whatever arrange-
ments are appropriate" for maintaining effective contact with "inter-
national organizations of . . . producers, traders and manufac-
turers," and only the Cocoa Agreement specifically permits the
presence by invitation of private entities as observers at meetings of
the Council.7
b. Members' Obligations
Membership in international commodity agreements entails a
number of obligations. The first obligation is the duty of member
countries to restrict their transactions in the commodity outside of
the agreement. The restrictions imposed by the agreement fall into
one of three categories: (1) restrictions on the quantity of the com-
modity that a member may import from non-members;" (2) restric-
tions on the terms that members may offer to, or accept from, non-
members;" or (3) restrictions on the amount or timing of a member's
69. Art. 50 of the Tin Agreement and art. 4 of the Cocoa Agreement. With respect
to voting, art. 4(2) of the Cocoa Agreement states: "Such intergovernmental organiza-
tions shall not themselves have any votes, but in the case of a vote on matters within
their competence, they shall be entitled to cast the votes of their member States and
shall cast them collectively. In such cases the member States of such intergovern-
mental organizations shall not be entitled to exercise their individual voting rights."
The definition of intergovernmental organizations which may join the Agreement
as organizations "having responsibilities in respect of the negotiation" of international
agreements appears broad enough to encompass both members' groups (supra, notes
63 and 64) and international organizations such as the FAO. Since the Cocoa and Tin
Agreements are the two most recent international commodity agreements concluded,
their inclusion of a provision that goes beyond mere observer status for intergovern-
mental organizations, but also allows their membership, may indicate an increasing
tendency in commodity agreements to recognize the vital role played in international
affairs by such organizations.
70. Art. 13(3) of the Cocoa Agreement.
71. Art. 12(3) of the Sugar Agreement.
72. Art. 14(2) of the Cocoa Agreement. However, the language of art. 21 of the
Coffee Agreement seems sufficiently broad as to also permit the invitation of private
organizations as observers.
73. These restrictions operate by limiting members to the amount they imported
from non-members in a fixed, antecedent period. See note 33, supra.
74. This type of restriction requires that the member not deal with non-members
on terms that are "commercially more favorable" than those established within the
commodity agreement. See note 32 supra.
500 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
exports of the commodity outside the agreement.75
Despite these restrictions, commodity agreements as a rule have
encountered great difficulty in regulating transactions between mem-
bers and non-members, in part because many of these outside trans-
actions involve long-term bilateral agreements already in effect at the
inception of the commodity agreement,76 and in part because these
transactions often represent "concessional sales"77 which are difficult
to challenge on moral terms, as well as laden with political signifi-
cance.
Second, the agreements require members to furnish the organi-
zation with such information as the organization deems necessary for
the effective operation of the agreements. While the information re-
quired depends on the type of agreement involved, it usually includes
reports on production and consumption, sales, prices, exports, im-
ports, stocks and taxation.78
Third, members are responsible for the financing of the organi-
zation. This obligation is met through contributions assessed in pro-
portion to the number of votes which the member casts within the
organization, which in turn reflects the significance of the member
in the trade regulated by the agreement.79 Fourth, members agree to
be bound by decisions of the organization as to matters allocated to
its discretion under the agreement. 0 Finally, members commit them-
selves to conducting their trade policies in a manner conducive to the
attainment of the agreement's objectives. s1
75. While the two prior types of restrictions are found in export quota agreements,
this form of restriction appears in buffer stock and multilateral contract agreements.
Here the objective is not so much to limit the members' transactions in the commodity
as to minimize any ill effect that those transactions might have on other exporter
members. These restrictions consequently limit themselves to either requiring that the
members consult with the organization or with other members before disposing of their
stocks, or to obliging members to limit their disposal of stockpiles or their sales on non-
commercial terms to those transactions which do not interfere with other members'
rights. See art. 24 of the Wheat Trade Convention, and art. 40 of the Tin Agreement.
76. These bilateral agreements are generally exempted from the terms of the
commodity agreements by a standard clause in the latter permitting members to
observe prior obligations. See, e.g., art. 54(8) of the Cocoa Agreement. However, the
Sugar Agreement specifically lists those "special arrangements" which are exempted
from the application of its terms. Arts. 34-39 of the Sugar Agreement.
77. The phrase "concessional sales" refers to donations and sales that are made
below the prevailing market rates. L. BARANYAI & MILLS, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY
AGREEMENTS 107 (1963). The Wheat Trade Convention defines "concessional sales" as
including "features introduced by the government of a country concerned which do not
conform with usual commercial practices." Art. 3(2) of the Wheat Trade Convention.
78. See, e.g., arts. 56(2) and (3) of the Cocoa Agreement.
79. See, e.g., art. 24 of the Coffee Agreement.
80. See, e.g., art. 12(4) of the Cocoa Agreement.
81. One trade policy that is specifically enumerated in art. 44 of the Cocoa Agree-
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c. Organization and Administration
International commodity agreements provide for a three-tiered
administration consisting of a Council, an Executive Committee (or
Board) and a Secretariat. 82
ment and art. 30 of the Sugar Agreement involves the duty of exporting members under
these export quota agreements to pursue such a course of action in their sales and
exports so as to not artificially restrict the supplies of the commodity available to
importing members below the quotas established in the agreement. In the case of the
Cocoa Agreement, this assurance of supplies is combined with an obligation to, in
times of scarcity, give preference to importing member countries over non-members.
Art. 44 of the Cocoa Agreement.
Another trade policy that is often articulated is that of increasing consumption,
and/or reducing trade obstacles to consumption, in importing countries. See, e.g., art.
50 of the Cocoa Agreement. These "obstacles" presumably include "tariffs, quotas,
import monopolies and other administrative rules and practices." Art. 47 of the Coffee
Agreement. Yet despite the inclusion of provisions articulating this objective, very
little has been accomplished in terms of reducing obstacles to trade through commod-
ity agreements. U.N. Doc. TD/180, vol. II, at 20, para. 45 (1972). This lack of accom-
plishment seems attributable to the failure of commodity agreements to include spe-
cific guidelines for the reduction of protectionist barriers.
The Members' obligation to conduct their trade policies in a manner conducive
to the attainment of the objectives of the agreement implies a duty for member govern-
ments to restrain private concerns within their jurisdiction from behaving in ways
inconsistent with those objectives. This implied duty is the sole provision that is to be
found in international commodity agreements with respect to the behavior of private
entities such as multinational corporations; commodity agreements have thus far re-
frained from including measures to be jointly adopted by importing and exporting
members to regulate the behavior of private entities whose activities span the jurisdic-
tion of both importing and exporting nations.
Finally, it should be noted that the preponderance of the obligations in commodity
agreements (with the exception of multilateral contract schemes, which apportion
duties equally to importers and exporters) falls on the exporting countries. Thus, in
export quota agreements it is the exporters who must restrict their exports, while
importers remain free of any similarly burdensome responsibility. This disparity in
obligations between exporting and importing countries may reflect the historical and
political context in which the various types of agreements have developed. Thus, both
export quota and buffer stock approaches were first utilized in the pre-World War II
period in agreements whose primary function was to alleviate the catastrophic effects
of the depression on commodity exports, while the multilateral contract scheme was
first adopted in the post-war period, when the approved objective of commodity agree-
ments was price stability, not price support. As a result, export quota and buffer stock
agreements may continue to be viewed as schemes whose primary beneficiaries are
exporters, while multilateral contract schemes are perceived as equally benefitting all
parties concerned. It is therefore understandable that the tendency in export quota and
buffer stock schemes would be to place a disproportionate amount of the responsibility
on exporters while multilateral contract agreements would tend to allocate the duties
more even-handedly.
82. The Wheat Trade Convention also called for the establishment of a Prices
Review Committee whose primary function was to review the situation when either
price stability or the price minimum was threatened and suggest action to be taken
by participants to remedy the situation. Art. 8 of the Wheat Trade Convention.
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The Council is the principal policy-making body of the agree-
ment. It comprises representatives of all the members; in this respect
it is analogous to the assemblies of the specialized international agen-
cies. "3 Decisions of the Council are reached through voting by the
members' representatives. Votes are distributed in the same fashion
in all of the agreements: the importing and exporting countries are
each given an equal number of votes, one thousand, to be distributed
among each group;84 a maximum may then be established of up to
four hundred, or four hundred and fifty, votes for any member coun-
try, 5 the votes being distributed in proportion to the member's signif-
icance in the world trade of the commodity as reflected either by its
exports or imports,88 or by its production and consumption tonnage. 7
Decisions by the Council are taken by a "distributed" simple
majority - that is, a majority in each of the importing and exporting
groups - except where the agreement requires a distributed two-
thirds majority." In the latter situation, the possibility arises that one
or two members, having between them more than one-third of the
total number of votes within the exporting or importing group will
obstruct a measure favored by the remaining members. To avoid this
possibility, both the Coffee and Cocoa Agreements adopted a mecha-
nism under which, if a proposal is blocked by the votes of three or
fewer exporting members, the proposal may be resubmitted within
83. Faucett, supra note 31, at 168-69.
84. See, e.g., art. 27 of the Wheat Trade Convention.
85. The Tin Agreement sets a maximum of 450 votes (art. 8); the Cocoa Agree-
ment, 300 votes (art. 10); the Sugar Agreements, 200 votes (art. 9); and the Coffee
Agreement, 400 votes (art. 12). The agreements usually also mandate a minimum of 5
votes for any member. See, e.g., art. 12(2) of the Coffee Agreement.
86. As in the Coffee Agreement (art. 12) and the Cocoa Agreement (art. 10).
87. As in the Tin Agreement (art. 11). Both the Sugar Agreement (art. 9) and the
Wheat Trade Convention (art. 27) leave the apportionment of votes to the Council.
The system of apportioning votes within the agreement in accordance with the individ-
ual countries' significance in world trade of the commodity, known as "weighed vot-
ing" is a "method ... formulated since the war in order to resolve disputes which are
not too 'political' or 'important' to foreclose any method except diplomacy, but are
important enough that nations prefer to avoid their decision by impartial judges or
arbitrators." S. METZGER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1212 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as METZGER]. This method, which was first adopted in commodity agreements
in the International Wheat Agreement of 1949 (Id., at 1215) has the advantage over a
one-nation, one-vote system of "allocat[ing] influence on the basis of relative invest-
ment." Id., at 1223.
88. The agreements prescribe a two-thirds majority for a handful of decisions
whose importance is deemed to merit special treatment. Thus, for example, the Wheat
Trade Convention requires a two-thirds distributed majority for decisions granting
relief from the obligations of the Convention (art. 21); for decisions to accept new
members (art. 38(2)); and for decisions to delegate the Council's powers to the Execu-
tive Committee (art. 26(5)). But the agreements differ as to what decisions require a
two-thirds vote.
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forty-eight hours by a distributed simple majority vote. If the opposi-
tion has decreased to two members still holding more than one-third
of the votes within a group, the proposal may be revived within
twenty-four hours. If at that time the opposition has further dimin-
ished to one member, the proposal is considered adopted regardless
of the size of the holdout's vote. 9
In addition to the Council, the agreements typically provide for
the creation of an Executive Committee, comprising representatives
of both exporting and importing countries,90 to which the Council
may delegate its duties and powers, with some key exceptions.9' In
addition, the agreements call for the appointment by the Council of
a Secretariat whose function is to administer the agreement in ac-
cordance with the policies established by the Council. 92 The Secre-
tariat is to have international status and is to refrain from taking
instructions from any person or authority except the Council. 3 Fur-
thermore, members of the Secretariat may not possess any financial
interests in the world trade of the commodity governed."
The Council is given legal personality, and the capability "to
contract, to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property,
and to institute legal proceedings." 5 As a result, one observer has
likened the International Tin Council to "a public corporate body,
having proprietary rights in the buffer stock, evidenced by the capa-
city to operate it by purchase and sale of tin, with the accompanying
issue of tin warrants.""
89. See art. 12 of the Cocoa Agreement and art. 14 of the Coffee Agreement. The
importance of this mechanism lies in its preventing a single major member from
exercising an effective veto power over all other members. Given the obstacles to abuse
of any member by a majority which are inherent in the distributed majority system of
voting, such a veto power is unnecessary and is likely to result in more harm than
good.
90. See, e.g., art. 15 of the Cocoa Agreement.
91. Art. 17 of the Cocoa Agreement, for example, lists the following exceptions:
(a) redistribution of votes; (b) approval of the administrative budget and the assess-
ment of contributions; (c) revision of minimum and maximum prices; (d) exemption
or inclusion of fine cocoa in the members' quotas; (e) determination of annual export
quotas; (f) restriction or suspension of purchases by the buffer stock; (g) action relating
to the diversion of cocoa to non-traditional uses; (h) relief from obligations under the
Agreement; (i) decision of disputes; (j) suspension of members' rights; (k) establish-
ment of conditions for accession; (I) exclusion of a member; (m) extension or termina-
tion of the Cocoa Agreement; and (n) recommendation of amendments to members.
92. See, e.g., art. 20 of the Cocoa Agreement.
93. Id., para. 8.
94. Id., para. 7.
95. Art. 21(1) of the Cocoa Agreement.
96. Faucett, supra note 31, at 173.
1975
504 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
d. The Council's Powers
All of the agreements contain a broadly worded clause empower-
ing the Council to "exercise all such powers and perform or arrange
for the performance of all such functions as are necessary to carry out
the express provisions of this Agreement."97 These powers and func-
tions fall within one of three categories: (1) the collection and distri-
bution of information on the trade of commodities; (2) consultation
on the policy to be followed by the agreement; and (3) supervision of
the agreement, including the enforcement of participants' obligations
under it.
Collection and Distribution of Information. This category com-
prises four distinct types of activities: (a) the collection of informa-
tion from member countries;9" (b) the collection of information from
other sources, including the promotion of scientific and technical
research in commodity production or other aspects of commodity
trade;9 (c) the maintenance of records; and (d) the issuance of peri-
odic reports on conditions of world commodity production and trade.
Through these activities the councils, which are allowed broad discre-
tion by the agreements, become valuable centers of information on
world trade.
Consultation on Policy. Here four activities deserve elaboration:
settlement of disputes, amendment of the agreements, taxation, and
giving economic aid to members.
The settlement of disputes is said to be regarded in international
organizations in the monetary and trade fields as ". . . essentially a
matter for negotiation by the interested parties, which may comprise
all members of the organization, a process of what has been well
called 'organized persuasion,' rather than arbitral or judicial deci-
sion."'100 Commodity agreements are no exception to this observation.
The distinguishing feature of the settlement of disputes in these
agreements is that the mode of settlement is internal, 10 a quality
97. See, e.g., art. 7 of the Cocoa Agreement.
98. The obligation of member countries to provide the Council with such informa-
tion as it deems necessary for its operations has already been noted; see text accompa-
nying note 81, supra. While the discretion of the Council as to what information it may
solicit is largely unchecked, two of the agreements do impose restrictions. Thus art.
41(a)(i) of the Tin Agreement excludes a member country from having to "furnish any
information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security inter-
ests;" and art. 55(2) of the Coffee Agreement protects the anonymity of the entrepre-
neurs in the world coffee trade by stating that "no information shall be published
which might serve to identify the operations of persons or companies producing, pro-
cessing or marketing coffee."
99. See, e.g., art. 57 of the Cocoa Agreement.
100. Faucett, supra note 31, at 176.
101. Id., at 175.
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which may be attributed to considering dispute-settlement as a part
of the normal administration of the agreement by members. 0
The agreements generally provide a two-step dispute-settlement
mechanism. The first step involves consultation among the disputing
members, in the course of which, with the consent of the parties, the
organization may be empowered to appoint an independent panel
"which shall use its good offices with a view to conciliating the par-
ties."'' 3 If these efforts fail, the second step is invoked and the matter
is submitted to a third-party decision-maker which, with but one
exception,' is the Council. While the Council may then at the re-
quest of either a majority of the members or of members holding no
less than one-third of the total votes, refer the matter temporarily to
an advisory panel, 05 the dispute will ultimately be decided by a dis-
tributed majority vote.1°R No appeal is provided.
For amendments, international commodity agreements contain
two types of provisions. The first empowers the Council periodically
to review and modify a specific aspect of the agreement, such as
export quotas'07 or the price range of the buffer stock. 00 The second
102. METZGER, supra note 90, at 1223.
103. See, e.g., art. 58 of the Coffee Agreement.
104. The exception arises in the Coffee Agreement where, if consultation fails,
disputes between members as to whether exporters are guilty of "discriminatory treat-
ment in favor of processed coffee as compared with green coffee," are referred to an
arbitration panel whose determination is final. Art. 44 of the Coffee Agreement.
105. See, e.g., art. 61 of the Cocoa Agreement.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., art. 31 of the Cocoa Agreement.
108. See, e.g., art. 29 of the Cocoa Agreement. Only two of the agreements-the
Cocoa and Tin agreements-specifically empower the Council to revise the price objec-
tives of the agreement. Each of these agreements contains two provisions dealing with
the revisions of prices by the Council. The first of these provisions (art. 29 of the Cocoa
Agreement and art. 19 of the Tin Agreement) gives the Council broad discretionary
powers to modify the price objectives of the agreement. The second (art. 42 of the
Cocoa Agreement and art. 29 of the Tin Agreement) is more narrowly drawn in that it
limits itself to calling for possible Council action to change prices in case of "changes
in exchange rates."
Art. 27 of the Coffee Agreement also seems to imply a similar power in the Coffee
Council to change prices. But neither the Wheat Trade Convention nor the Sugar
Agreement makes provision for its Councils to modify prices on its own, and presuma-
bly any price changes that might arise in those agreements would take place via the
process of proposal and ratification discussed in the text with respect to amendments
of the second type. While this second process is more cumbersome than that of the
Coffee, Cocoa, and Tin Agreements, neither approach is likely to be conducive to price
flexibility, for in both cases all price modifications (even those in the case of change
in exchange rates under the Cocoa and Tin Agreements, supra) must be approved by
a majority of both exporter and importer members, one of which groups will inevitably
be adversely affected by any price change that may be instituted. This lack of price
flexibility would seem to reduce the value and stability of commodity agreements in
times of world inflation.
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represents a broad delegation of power to the Council to recommend
amendments of the agreement to member countries. However, in
these instances the amendments become effective only if a sufficient
number of member countries individually ratify them.'
As to the power to tax, both the Cocoa and Coffee Agreements
permit the Council to levy a tax on members' transactions for pur-
poses stated within the agreement, although the method of taxation
and the purposes for the tax differs in each case. The Cocoa Agree-
ment authorizes the Council to collect a tax of no more than one U.S.
cent per pound "either on first export by a member or on first import
by a member" in order to finance the buffer stock."' The Coffee
Agreement calls for a "Diversification Fund," financed by a tax lev-
ied on major exporters' transactions, whose purpose it is to channel
funds paid by a member country back to that country for use in
developmental, non-coffee-related projects approved by the Fund."'
In addition to the standard services"' that Councils provide for
members of the agreements, two of the agreements permit the Coun-
cil to provide forms of economic aid to its members. Article 44 of the
Sugar Agreement calls for the creation of a "Hardship Fund" to be
administered by the Council "which shall be available at its discre-
tion to meet special cases of hardship among developing members
which have sugar available for export over and above their permitted
level of exports under the Agreement.""' More importantly, the
Cocoa Agreement uses its buffer stock to purchase excess production
109. Under art. 75(1) of the Cocoa Agreement, for example, amendments must be
ratified by at least 75 percent of the exporting members holding at least 85 percent of
the votes of exporting members, and a similar number of importing members, before
they go into effect. The question arises as to why amendments enacted under this
second type of provision must be individually ratified by the members, whereas
amendments under the first type need only be adopted by the Council. The answer
lies in that amendments under the first type are narrowly delineated, with specific
guidelines often incorporated into the agreement itself, while amendments under the
second type may theoretically cover any aspect of the agreement. As a result, members
are reluctant to, in the latter situation, surrender the power of amendment to the
Council, for fear of having further undefined obligations imposed on them.
110. Art. 38 of the Cocoa Agreement.
111. Art. 54 of the Coffee Agreement represents the highwater mark of direct
international economic planning, and concomitantly of the surrender of traditionally
sovereign prerogatives of a member state, in the commodity agreements. Its objective
is to limit the production of coffee so as to bring supply into balance with world
demand.
112. Such as the informational services which the Council provides, noted supra.
113. Since art. 44 does not provide a separate method for the financing of the
"Hardship Fund," that fund is presumably regarded as part of the Organization's
budget and is financed by contributions from each member "in the proportion which
the number of its votes . . . bears to the total votes of all the Members." Art. 22(2).
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from members at reduced rates, thus softening the effect on mem-
bers' economies of the export quotas imposed by the agreement."'
Supervision. Supervision of members' obligations under the
agreement requires empowering the Council to apply a variety of
sanctions for violations of those obligations. Commodity agreements
endow the Council with discretion to impose a series of sanctions,
including forfeiture of rights in the liquidation of the buffer stock,"
reduction of member's export quota," 6 the suspension of voting
rights,"7 and exclusion from further participation in the agreement."'
Sanctions are generally imposed by a distributed two-thirds majority
vote of the Council"9 and no appeal mechanism is provided.
e. Variations Within a Commodity, Processed Products, and
Substitute Products
Commodities which are the subject of agreements may comprise
114. Arts. 37-40 of the Cocoa Agreement. Two observations as to the operation of
this buffer stock are in order. First, the stock acts as a safety valve, absorbing the
excess production of members at rates which, while lower than those on the world
market (so as to minimize any encouragement to increased production that the availa-
bility of this outlet would create) provide some reimbursement, thereby lessening the
pressure that the members might otherwise feel to abandon the Agreement. Second,
the stock operates differently from the traditional buffer stock in that while both are
authorized to sell their resources on the world market in defense of a maximum price,
the traditional buffer stock defends the minimum price by purchasing at large on the
world market, while the buffer stock in the Cocoa Agreement limits itself to buying
directly from its members.
The effect of this limitation is to restrict the economic assistance which the Coun-
cil provides to members of the Agreement, although both members and non-members
theoretically benefit from the price conditions which the Agreement creates on the
world market. This restriction to members of the economic assistance provided by the
Council, which parallels a similar limitation in the Sugar Agreement's "Hardship
Fund" (discussed in the text, supra), logically has the effect of acting as a further
inducement for exporting countries to join the Agreement.
In terms of economic assistance, commodity agreements are not limited to provi-
sions calling for aid from the Council to members, but may also implicitly encourage
or explicitly provide for country-to-country assistance. The implicit encouragement
most often takes the form of excluding, within limits, charitable donations of the
commodity from the computation of a member's quota. See, e.g., art. 43 of the Sugar
Agreement. As to explicit provisions for country-to-country aid, the most striking is
the Food Aid Convention of 1967 and 1971, supra note 48, which, as the flip-side of
the Wheat Trade Convention in the International Grains Arrangement of 1967 and
1971, is dedicated exclusively to committing exporting countries to providing a fixed
amount of aid, either in cash or in food, to developing countries. Consequently, the
concept of aid is not alien to commodity agreements.
115. See, e.g., arts. 23(b) and 32(a) of the Tin Agreement.
116..See, e.g., art. 38 of the Coffee Agreement.
117. See, e.g., art. 62 of the Cocoa Agreement.
118. See, e.g., art. 72 of the Cocoa Agreement.
119. See, e.g., arts. 59(7) and 67 of the Coffee Agreement.
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different types of the same product. International commodity agree-
ments recognize these differences and make allowances for them. For
example, the Wheat Trade Convention provides price ranges for thir-
teen types of wheat and calls for price adjustments depending on the
transportation costs between the country of origin and the country of
destination.20
None of the multilateral contract or export quota agreements
establishes quotas for particular types of a commodity, leaving to the
members' discretion what types they will export or import. The
Sugar 2' and Cocoa 2  Agreements, however, exclude certain varia-
tions of the commodity from the terms of the agreement, with the
proviso that these variations may be brought under the regulation of
the agreement should their trade increase to levels that threaten to
disrupt the agrement. The Coffee Agreement, while not differentiat-
ing between the various types of coffee in assigning export members'
original quotas, does empower the Council "to adopt a system for the
adjustment of annual and quarterly quotas in relation to the move-
ment of the prices of the principal types of coffee."
'' 23
In terms of processed products of a commodity, the export quota
and multilateral contract agreements have two common characteris-
tics. First, they provide that processed product exports of the com-
modity be included in determining a member's obligations under the
agreement. 4 Second, none establishes prices for processed products,
probably because of the difficulty of reaching agreement upon, and
enforcing, a scheme of prices for the numerous processed products
that may be made from a given commodity.
12 5
120. Art. 6 of the Wheat Trade Convention.
121. Art. 2(15)(a) and (b) of the Sugar Agreement.
122. Art. 33 of the Cocoa Agreement.
123. Art. 37(2) of the Coffee Agreement. This flexible provision permits the Coun-
cil to react to variations in demand reflecting changes in consumer tastes by increasing
or decreasing the supply of each type of coffee.
124. Art. 2(1)(cc) of the Wheat Trade Convention; art. 2 of the Cocoa Agreement;
art. 2(15) of the Sugar Agreement; art. 2(1) of the Coffee Agreement.
125. The combination of these two characteristics raises the possibility that ex-
porting members, in meeting their quota obligations under the agreements, will choose
to export nothing but processed products, and that in order to do so they will institute
various schemes (such as subsidies) to make these products more attractive to import-
ers. Such a policy is disruptive of the agreement in two ways. First, it is likely to create
tension between importers and exporters, both of which desire the increased employ-
ment and balance-of-payments advantages that accompany having the refining and
processing of the raw materials done within their national boundaries. Second, the
danger arises of price competition in processed products between the exporting mem-
bers of the agreements.
All of the agreements confront these possibilities in the same way. First, the
agreements contain a provision either denouncing the use of subsidies (see, e.g., art.
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Finally, the term "commodity" can encompass substitutes for
the commodity concerned. 6 Commodity agreements, however, have
done very little to regulate the development and use of substitute
products, again probably because of the complexity of attempting to
do so. Consequently, only the Cocoa' and Coffee 2 " Agreements con-
tain provisions calling for members to regulate the use of substitutes
within their territories.
IV. TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM AGREEMENT
A. The Desirability of an International Petroleum Agreement
Given the desirability of cooperative action between petroleum-
exporters and -importers, there are two reasons why that action
should take the form of an international commodity agreement on
petroleum.
First, of the different vehicles available for cooperative action
between exporters and importers, only an international commodity
agreement would permit the problems of the world petroleum indus-
try to be viewed and dealt with as a comprehensive whole. This
assertion can best be understood by analyzing the two alternative
forms of cooperative action available-bilateral agreements, and
multilateral agreements limited to select aspects of the industry. '
Bilateral agreements between petroleum-exporters and -im-
porters became popular in early 1974. Thus, in January 1974, France
and Saudi Arabia announced the conclusion of an agreement under
which Saudi Arabia will provide France with 800 million tons of
oil over 20 years in return for "armaments, military aircraft, and
other kinds of equipment."' 29 Similar highly publicized agreements
have been concluded between France and Iran, 3 and Iraq and
Japan,' 3' although in each of these cases the consideration provided
by the importer has differed.
Since, theoretically, there are no limitations as to what areas of
the world petroleum industry these agreements might cover, a net-
work of bilateral agreements constitutes a plausible system leading
to the resolution of the problem areas of the world petroleum industry
and, consequently, to the stability of that industry. In addition, bilat-
50 of the Sugar Agreement), or calling for prices of processed products to be consistent
with the raw material prices established in the agreement (see, e.g., art. 7 of the Wheat
Trade Convention). Second, if a dispute arises, the dispute-settling procedure deline-
ated in the text accompanying notes 101-06, supra is invoked.
126. See note 27, supra.
127. Art. 52 of the Cocoa Agreement.
128. Art. 52 of the Coffee Agreement.
129. PETROLEUM TIMES, Jan. 11, 1974, at 3.
130. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
131. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1974, at 29, col. 6.
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eral agreements possess certain intrinsic advantages over multilateral
agreements: they may be readily adapted to the unique conditions of
the individual participating countries, and they may be easier to
negotiate than multilateral agreements. Nevertheless, a system of
bilateral agreements would also have disadvantages. First, such a
system would be likely to result in a patchwork arrangement for the
world petroleum industry that might be both chaotic and destabiliz-
ing. Second, a bilateral agreement approach might well victimize the
smaller importers, who have little to offer in return for the petroleum
they need; these nations might find it either difficult to supply their
needs or to do so only on usurious terms.
The second alternative would be a multilateral agreement (or a
series of such agreements), on select facets of the industry. An exam-
ple of such an agreement would be an international price agreement.
This type of agreement, too, possesses inherent advantages and dis-
advantages when compared to the other alternatives. Thus, a multi-
lateral agreement limited to select facets of the industry is preferable
to a system of bilateral agreements in that the multilateral agreement
would be more likely to provide a uniform approach to those facets
of the industry, and less likely to exclude any interested parties.
Similarly, a multilateral agreement limited to select facets of the
industry might be easier to negotiate than the more comprehensive
international commodity agreement. On the negative side, however,
a multilateral agreement limited to select facets of the industry
might, by failing to encompass other interrelated facets of the world
petroleum industry, contain the seeds of its own destruction. As an
example, an international price agreement that fails to stipulate an
accepted system for adjusting supply to demand is likely to eventu-
ally collapse. This lack of comprehensiveness could of course be cured
through the conclusion of a series of these agreements, each limited
to a select number of issues.
This approach, too, has a major drawback: it may be more diffi-
cult to reach agreement separately on the various troublesome as-
pects of the industry than to do so by attacking them collectively.
Thus, an international commodity agreement on petroleum provides
the only alternative that would guarantee both universal participa-
tion and a concurrent assault on the various problem areas of the
world petroleum industry.
Second, the conclusion of an international commodity agreement
on petroleum would enhance the stature of commodity agreements as
vehicles for the rational international supervision of world trade, both
as a result of the petroleum agreement's mere existence, and as a
result of new approaches to commodity agreements that the petro-
leum agreement could incorporate. This enhanced stature might then
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facilitate the conclusion of similar agreements in other commodities,
thereby assisting the exporters and importers of those other commod-
ities to balance their needs and avoid severe confrontations or trade
breakdowns.32
B. Suggested Structural Components of an International Petroleum
Agreement
1. Type of Agreement
The first issue is identification of the type of agreement most
suitable to petroleum trade. Of the three possibilities - buffer stock,
multilateral contract, or export quota - the buffer stock may be
dismissed because the objective of a petroleum agreement would be
price support, not price stability,' and buffer stock agreements are
only suited for the latter objective;' and because the costs of creating
and operating a petroleum buffer stock would be astronomical.
Since the purpose of multilateral contract agreements is to pro-
vide a form of "mutual insurance" between exporters and importers
by guaranteeing each a fixed volume of purchases and sales within a
predetermined price range, while permitting a free market where
prices can evince long-term tendencies in supply and demand, the
applicability of this type of agreement to the world petroleum trade
is questionable, since that part of the petroleum trade not covered by
the agreement, rather than operating in a free market, would un-
doubtedly continue to be the object of attempted monopoly by the
exporting countries. As a result, not only would the policy underlying
the agreement not be realized, but the conflict and uncertainty that
might arise in that part of the trade not covered by the agreement
could well permeate the agreement and impede its operation.
132. In the case of certain commodities, such as copper and perhaps bauxite, it
might prevent possible abuse of consumers by staying the creation of exporters' cartels
such as OPEC. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1974, at 61, col. 1; Id., Nov. 13, 1974, at 61, col.
1; Id., Nov. 6, 1974, at 67, col. 2; Id., Jan. 26, 1975, § 3, part 11, at 47, col. 1. For an
analysis of the attributes necessary in a mineral for an exporters' cartel to be effective
see Varon & Takeuchi, Developing Countries and Non-Fuel Minerals, 52 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 497 (1974). For a debate on the probability of further commodity cartels, see
Bergsten, The New Era in World Commodity Markets, 17 CHALLENGE, no. 4, at 34; and
Mikesell, More Commodity Cartels Ahead?, 17 CHALLENGE, no. 5, at 24. In the case of
other commodities, for which the OPEC model is not feasible, it might allow those
developing countries whose economies are dependent on those commodities a fair and
stable return on their exports, in accordance with principles set forth in the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, U.N. Doc. A/C 2/L 1386 (1974) and reaf-
firmed both at the Dakar Conference of early 1975 by ministers representing 110
developing nations (N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1975, at 4, col. 4, and in the Lome Convention,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1975, at col. 1).
133. This would be true even though the world petroleum price incorporated into
the agreement might be lower than current prices.
134. As noted in text accompanying note 45, supra.
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There remains then, the export quota type of agreement; it is this
form of international commodity agreement that is best suited to the
world petroleum trade. Not only would an export quota petroleum
agreement permit the parties to pursue a price support objective by
adjusting supply to demand, but petroleum is a product which lends
itself to this type of agreement, as its production can be predicted due
to its lack of susceptibility to variations in harvest or weather.' u
The first obstacle to be surmounted in constructing a petroleum
export quota agreement would be the divination of a generally ac-
ceptable formula for the allocation of export quotas among the ex-
porting countries. This task, which was unsuccessfully undertaken in
1965-1966 and 1966-1967 by the member countries of OPEC, 38 may
be difficult. There are, however, two factors that might bring success
in a current attempt to regulate production through an international
petroleum agreement, but were not available in the previous unsuc-
cessful efforts by OPEC. The first is that importing countries, as
members of the agreement, could exert a positive influence on recalci-
trant exporters both in the negotiations and in the subsequent polic-
ing that would be necessary to enforce the agreement. The second is
that various exporting countries - which since 1966 have grown in-
creasingly alarmed at the possibility of depleting their petroleum
reserves in the near future - are likely to be more receptive now than
in the past to limitations on the amounts they export, provided they
receive an acceptable price for their product. Nevertheless, unless the
petroleum agreement encompassed a high proportion of the world
petroleum trade, it would be necessary to impose limitations on the
135. Given the predictability with which petroleum production can be controlled,
a combination export quota-buffer stock agreement would not be appropriate for three
reasons. First, because, unlike the cocoa trade (see note 118, supra), there should be
no need for a stock to absorb accidental excess production by member countries.
Second, it would be inappropriate since a stock's intervention on the world petroleum
market in order to compensate for inaccurate projections as to world demand would
not be necessary, both because inaccuracies on the supply side will be minimal and
because those inaccuracies that do arise can be dealt with by drawing on members'
reserve stocks pending modification of export quotas. Third, because in view of the
limited utility of a supplementary buffer stock, the monetary cost and additional
administrative complications that it would bring would not be justified.
136. The 1965 and 1966 OPEC production programming plans rejected the histori-
cal market share formula generally adopted in export quota agreements (noted in text
accompanying note 36, supra), but rather involved six factors which were weighed
equally in computing a country's quota: area; petroleum reserves; population; average
historical rate of petroleum production growth; percentage oil income in government
revenue; and total expenditure and development. For an analysis of this unsuccessful
attempt to regulate production see Chapter 5, "The Joint Regulation of Production,"
in MIKDASHI, supra note 6, at 111.
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amount of trade"3 7 and on the conditions of trade'3 between members
and non-members. 39
There are several considerations that would go into the computa-
tion of the price structure for a petroleum commodity agreement.
First, the negotiations would have to take into account the complex
price structure that now governs the world crude petroleum trade, a
structure that not only makes allowance for such factors as the qual-
ity of the petroleum involved and the proximity of an exporting coun-
try to major importer markets,'40 but which in many OPEC nations
also comprises three separate price formulas, each applicable in dif-
ferent circumstances."' However, insofar as other commodity agree-
ments have successfully managed to deal with similar price eccentri-
cities,"' the complexity of the world crude petroleum price structure
should not prove a bar to an agreement. Second, while exporting and
importing countries may differ as to what constitutes an equitable
petroleum price, the variance may not be as large as one would ini-
tially expect, for many importing countries share an interest with the
exporting nations in high petroleum prices. This interest stems, in the
case of the developed importing countries, from the fact that high
world petroleum prices justify those countries' costly attachment to,
137. As has been true in past export quota agreements. See text accompanying
note 33, supra.
138. As has been true in past export quota agreements. See text accompanying
note 32, supra.
139. As was observed at note 33 supra, the ideal provision in terms of maximum
inducement for countries to join the agreement would be one barring member-non-
member transactions. However, such an extreme measure might not be politically
feasible.
Regardless of what type of provision is enacted, it will be necessary to institute a
mechanism similar to that of the Coffee and Cocoa Agreements (supra, note 34),
calling for the certification of exports, if restrictions on member-non-member trade are
to be enforced.
140. MIKDASHI, supra note 6, at 209.
141. The three formulas are, first, the posted price, which is in effect a legal fiction
used by the petroleum-exporting countries to calculate tax and royalty payments due
from the oil companies on petroleum which the companies produce and keep, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 20, 1973, § 4, at 1, col. 1; second, the "buyback price," which applies to
that petroleum which, while produced by the oil companies, belongs to the exporting
nations as a result of participation agreements reached between the two parties, and
which is bought back by the oil companies (Levy, supra note 14, at 691); and third,
the open market price, applicable to that participation crude which is not bought back
by the oil companies, as well as other petroleum sold by the exporter nations or the
companies on the open market. It is this last price that has undergone the most severe
fluctuations in the past year. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 4, 1974, at 25, col. 2.
For an exhaustive analysis of the pricing of crude petroleum see T. RIFAI, THE
PRICING OF CRUDE OIL (1974).
142. See text accompanying note 124, supra.
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and development of, domestic energy sources such as coal;' and
because there are important exporting interests within the developed
nations that stand to benefit substantially as a result of the exporting
countries' new wealth.144 As to the developing importing countries,
their lack of opposition to high petroleum prices, as manifested in
their lack of public criticism of the OPEC price hikes of recent years,
may be due to both a sense of identification with the petroleum
exporters, many of whom have traditionally been regarded as mem-
bers of the Third World bloc, and to a hope that the successful action
taken by the petroleum exporters might somehow translate into
higher prices for other commodities which they, the developing im-
porting countries, export. Finally, mutual concessions in the negoti-
ating process might lead to an acceptable compromise on pricing
mechanisms."'5
2. Participation
Participation in the agreement should be open to any country
wishing to join. 4 ' In order to facilitate universal participation, the
agreement should permit accession by an interested country. In
addition, while the terms for accession should initially be negotiated
by the Council and the petitioning party, dissatisfied petitioners
should be permitted to submit the terms to arbitration. 7
With respect to the unilateral withdrawal of members, the agree-
ment should be as restrictive as possible. Ideally, this policy would
translate into a requirement that the withdrawal of a member be
subject to the approval of an independent international authority.'48
The agreement should also contain a provision permitting
member countries, if the situation warranted, to change their
143. M. ADELMAN, THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET 250 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as ADELMAN]. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the floor price on petroleum
proposed by United States Secretary of State Kissinger to make alternative forms of
energy competitive and to encourage the development of high-cost petroleum fields.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1975, at 1, col. 4, and at 3, col. 1. This proposal, which would
facilitate price negotiations between exporters and importers by reducing the gap
between the objective they each espouse (N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1975, at 7, col. 1), has
now been accepted by other major petroleum importing countries. N.Y. Times, Mar.
21, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
144. ADELMAN, supra note 143, at 260.
145. Such as the price-escalator clause discussed in text accompanying notes 166-
67, infra.
146. This should be true whether the country is an exporter or importer, as has
been true of past commodity agreements. See text accompanying note 50, supra.
147. Such a provision is designed to prevent any possible abuse of petitioning
countries with respect to the terms granted them by the nations which are already
members of the agreement. See note 52, supra.
148. So as to reduce the instability that may result from permitting the discretion-
ary withdrawal of members. See text accompanying note 60, supra.
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classification from importer to exporter or vice-versa.'49 Such a provi-
sion would allow the continued participation of countries such as
Great Britain and Norway which, while currently petroleum-
importers, are expected to become exporters within a few years.
Group membership should be allowed, permitting members of
OPEC and of the International Energy Agency to join, should they
so choose, as a group.'50 Inter-governmental organizations with an
interest in the negotiation of commodity agreements should also be
accepted as members as they were in the Tin and Cocoa Agree-
ments, '' so as to recognize the vital role played by such organizations
in international affairs. Finally, the international oil companies
should be granted permanent observer status at all meetings of the
new petroleum organization. Such status, which surpasses any status
for private organizations granted by the commodity agreements ana-
lyzed earlier,'52 would represent an acknowledgement of the import-
ance of the international oil companies in the world petroleum trade
and of the valuable knowledge and experience that they possess and
could bring to a cooperative effort to regulate the world petroleum
trade.
3. Members' Obligations
The obligations of participating countries should include the fol-
lowing:' 53 (1) members would be expected to finance the organization
administering the agreement through their contributions, which
would be apportioned in proportion to the number of votes to which
the member is entitled in the agreement;' (2) members would pro-
vide the organization with such information as it deems necessary for
its effective operation;' 5  (3) members would be bound by all decisions
reached through the decision-making process established within the
agreement;' 56 (4) exporting members would guarantee importing
members a steady supply of petroleum;'57 (5) importing members
149. This is true of the Tin Agreement, see text accompanying note 65, supra.
150. Such group membership has been accepted in past commodity agreements.
See text accompanying note 63, supra.
151. See text accompanying note 69, supra.
152. See text accompanying note 72, supra.
153. These do not include those other obligations incumbent in the type of agree-
ment utilized, as noted in text accompanying notes, 136-145, supra.
154. This has been found in past agreements. See text accompanying note 79,
supra.
155. This has been found in past agreements. See text accompanying note 78,
supra.
156. This has been found in past agreements. See text accompanying note 80,
supra.
157. Through their acquiescence to this provision, a sine qua non of importing
country participation, the exporting countries would forego the future use of their "oil
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would commit themselves to reducing protectionist barriers to trade
in refined petroleum products; 58 and (6) should the participating
weapon" and would accede to the depoliticization of this vital commodity. The provi-
sion might be patterned on art. 44 of the Cocoa Agreement and art. 30 of the Sugar
Agreement, discussed in note 81, supra. It should be noted that the communique issued
at the close of the March meeting of leaders of the OPEC countries affirmed the
"readiness" of these countries, "to insure supplies that will meet the essential require-
ments of the economies of developed countries provided that the consuming countries
do not use artificial barriers to distort the normal operation of the laws of demand and
supply." N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1975, at 12, col. 2.
158. The issue of access to import-markets for refined products, while not as
publicized as other issues within the petroleum industry, is one that should be con-
fronted by any petroleum agreement concluded, for if left disregarded it might eventu-
ally disrupt any amicable structure imposed on the world petroleum industry.
Since World War II there has been a steady trend towards locating petroleum
refineries near consuming areas rather than near sources of petroleum production.
Thus, while in 1939 some 70 percent of the world refining capacity outside North
America and the Communist countries was near the petroleum fields, by 1965 this
figure had dropped to 16 percent. E. PENROSE, THE LARGE INTERNATIONAL FIRM IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 82 (1968). The rea-
zons for this trend were: (1) the rapid increase in demand for a variety of refined
products, which made the construction of refineries in consumer countries economic;
(2) the development of large tankers, which favored the shipment of crude petroleum
rather than the more costly shipment of refined products in smaller tankers; (3) the
desire of importing countries to lessen foreign exchange costs by importing the less
expensive crude instead of refined products; (4) the fact that from a strategic point of
view the import of crude petroleum is somewhat more secure than the import of refined
products; (5) the economic advantages for the refining industry of processing a package
of crudes of different types with complementary characteristics close to the market,
compared to refining at crude oil production centers where generally less intake flexi-
bility is available; and (6) the importer country's desire for the profits available in the
refining activity. OECD, supra note 12, at 93, and at 73.
To spur the construction of refineries within their domain, importing country
governments have often imposed import duties on finished petroleum products. Id.,
at 93. These duties, which are both far more common and higher than similar duties
on crude petroleum (U.N. Doc. TD/97, vol. II, at 30, para. 222, 223 (1968)), have the
effect of discouraging world trade in refined petroleum products. As a result:
The share of refined products in total petroleum trade has been
declining. In 1965, refined products represented about eight percent of
the total net petroleum imports of Western Europe, compared with 13
percent in 1960 and 31 percent in 1950. This drop was more pronounced
in the case of EEC countries. In fact, this group of countries has recently
become a net exporter of refined products.
Id. at 93. There are indications that the petroleum-exporting countries, anxious to
industrialize their economies and provide domestic employment, as well as apprehen-
sive lest their lack of control over the petroleum refining process reduce their control
over this valuable resource, will in the future increasingly insist on the right to export
refined petroleum products as well as crude petroleum. OECD, supra note 12, at 102;
N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1975, § 3, part II, at 46, col. 4, and § 3, part IV, at 88, col. 1; Id.,
Feb. 22, 1975, at 33, col. 1. The importing countries and oil companies will be reluctant
to permit this for the same reasons that originally led them to move the refining
capacity from the exporting areas to the importing areas. Nevertheless, an accomoda-
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countries find it advisable, the agreement could contain specific
guidelines either governing the rate of growth of petroleum consump-
tion by, and/or establishing import quotas for, importing countries.159
tion does seem possible, if only because the opposition of the importing countries is
likely to be tempered by two problems surrounding the expansion of refinery capacity
within their jurisdiction: "environmental pollution, and the increasing difficulty in
finding suitable sites for the refinery capacity expansion required to meet future
growth." OECD, supra note 12, at 102.
Past commodity agreements have included provisions calling for the reduction of
protectionist barriers to trade, but these provisions have been ineffective. See note 81,
supra. This ineffectiveness has stemmed from the failure of those provisions to articu-
late specifically the importer's duty to reduce barriers to trade, and this mistake should
be avoided in any international petroleum agreement concluded. As one source writes:
Any assurances as to access to markets or as to the reduction of trade
barriers in respect of commodities covered by, or proposed to be made
subject to, international commodity agreements might appropriately be
incorporated in those agreements. While an attempt to include provisions
regarding the terms of access to the markets of protectionist developed
countries may make the conclusion or re-negotiation of such agreements
more difficult than would otherwise be the case, the objective of increased
access may well be regarded as sufficiently important to warrant such
attempts. Moreover, international commodity agreements would seem to
provide a very suitable multilateral instrument for the incorporation of
undertakings as to access and if possible, partially compensating under-
takings by developing and other exporting countries. U.N. Doc. TD/97,
vol. II, at 82, para. 81 (1968).
A necessary concomitant of importing country reductions of trade barriers would
be a provision modeled on art. 44 of the Coffee Agreement (supra, note 104) to prevent
exporting country discriminatory treatment in favor of processed products. See also
note 125, supra.
159. While arts. 57(d) and (f) of the Havana Charter listed "the equitable distri-
bution of a primary commodity in short supply" and the protection of "the natural
resources of the world . . . from unnecessary exhaustion" as two of the accepted
objectives for international commodity agreements, the agreements drafted since
World War II have, for lack of necessity, paid little attention to those objectives.
Perhaps it is time, now that we are entering an era of apparent scarcity in various raw
materials to revive these objectives and utilize commodity agreements for the alloca-
tion of commodities in short supply.
Whether petroleum is one of these commodities or not is a difficult question to
answer. Thus, while estimated world petroleum reserves range up to 2,000 billion
barrels (NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, RESOURCES AND MAN 194 (1969)), sufficient to
last-at current rates of consumption, 18 billion barrels a year-for over 100 years,
proven world petroleum reserves are about 600 billion barrels, or only enough to last
about 30 years. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1974, § 4, at 2, col. 1. Furthermore both figures
as to how long the estimated and proven reserves will last assume that consumption
will continue at present levels, rather than increasing steadily as has been true in the
last decade. See note 12, supra.
Given the tenuous nature of estimates as to possible world petroleum reserves, and
the lack of certainty as to whether alternative sources of energy capable of replacing
petroleum will be developed within the next 30 years, member countries of an interna-
tional petroleum agreement might decide to limit the rates of growth of world petro-
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In addition, the agreement might include provisions governing
select aspects of the relationship between the international oil com-
panies and member countries, and/or establishing a permanent
forum within the context of the agreement for the exchange of infor-
mation between the petroleum-exporting and -importing countries as
to the operation of the companies."
leum consumption by incorporating specific guidelines into the agreement. Should
that be the case, those guidelines must take into account the striking disparities
between petroleum consumption in the developed and developing countries, and the
fact that the latter group of countries will need proportionately larger amounts of
energy if they are to advance their retarded economic development.
Even if it is deemed that there is no impending world shortage of petroleum,
exporting countries may insist on the limitation of developed country consumption of
petroleum. The reason for this insistence is simple: some two-thirds of the world's
proven petroleum reserves are located in the OPEC countries, and certain of these
countries may be reluctant to permit the continued "wasteful" consumption of their
most valuable resource by the developed importing countries. (For overtones of this
attitude, see Amuzegar, supra note 1, at 676, and the communique issued by OPEC
after the March meeting of leaders of OPEC nations, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1975, at 12,
col. 2). Of course, if petroleum prices remain high, the exporting countries may be
persuaded to abandon any efforts in this direction, both because of the value that they
would obtain for their petroleum and because of the reduced world consumption of
petroleum that high prices would imply.
Should a reduction in petroleum consumption be deemed desirable, it could be
achieved through one of two methods, or through a combination of the two: (a) by
incorporation into the agreement of specific guidelines as to acceptable rates of growth
for petroleum consumption in particular countries or groups of countries; and (b) by
establishing import quotas. The appropriateness of each of these methods would de-
pend on whether the reason for its (their) application was exclusively a concern that
the exporting countries' reserves would be exhausted (in which case the imposition of
import quotas should suffice); or, rather a concern with the possible over-all depletion
of world petroleum reserves (in which case it would be desirable to implement a more
widespread system for limiting global petroleum consumption applicable, albeit with
variations, to all countries).
160. While the past few years have witnessed a precipitous decline in the role
played by international oil companies in the world petroleum industry, these compa-
nies will continue to play an important part in the future development of that industry.
Levy, supra note 13, at 694.
Given the continued significance of the oil companies, any attempt to stabilize the
world petroleum industry must delineate the niche that the companies will occupy in
that industry, at least to the point of eliminating the major sources of friction that may
arise between exporting and importing countries as a result of the companies' opera-
tions.
The future role of the oil companies cannot be determined unilaterally by the
importing or the exporting countries. Indeed, the oil companies are the very prototype
of the multinational corporations about which a recent U.N. report stated:
Since the tensions and conflicts that arise from the operations of
multinational corporations are international in character, programmes
which are limited to one side or to only some of the parties concerned are
unlikely to be adequate. In fact, some of the programmes, though desira-
ble from the point of view of the initiator, may generate a series of reac-
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4. Organization and Administration
The organizational structure of the proposed international petro-
leum agreement could be patterned on that of past commodity agree-
ments, a structure that has historically been acceptable to participat-
ing nations.'
5. The Council's Powers
The international petroleum agreement's Council should be
empowered to, first, collect and distribute information on the world
petroleum industry and on related energy matters.' In this respect
the Council should act to coordinate the efforts of both exporting and
importing countries to develop alternative sources, thus avoiding
unnecessary duplication of effort; and it should suggest means
whereby the enormous revenues being absorbed by the petroleum-
exporting countries may be channeled into the campaign to develop
new energy resources for the future."6
tions which are not entirely predictable.
Thus, efforts to raise the bargaining power of one side may induce
the other to take similar action. This is especially the case in the longer-
run, as has been frequently illustrated in the field of raw materials, where
substitutes may be developed and sellers'monopolies may nurture buyers'
monopsonies.
Moreover, it is not always possible to ensure even that a one-sided
measure will benefit the side it was designed to protect. The success of
certain host countries in obtaining larger revenues from multi-national
corporations may be accompanied by price increases which would shift
the burden to consumers, including many developing countries, rather
than result in a reduction of the corporation's profits.
International measures are clearly necessary to achieve a balanced
and more equitable solution. Those which appear to be ripe for immedi-
ate consideration are briefly assessed below.
U.N. Report on Multinational Corporations in World Development (Chapter IV,
"Towards a Programme of Action"), U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1973); also found in 12
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1109 (1973).
Among the "ripe" international measures which the report goes on to recommend
is the establishment of a forum for discussion and the harmonization of national
policies, particularly in the area of taxation. Both of these measures could be incorpo-
rated into an international petroleum agreement, along with other provisions to govern
future agreements between the companies and host countries, as well as guarantees
that such agreements would not be unilaterally modified.
The incorporation of such provisions in an international petroleum agreement
would mark a radical departure from past commodity agreements which, as is noted
in note 81, supra, have left the control of corporations to the unilateral discretion of
member countries, and would establish a precedent for future commodity schemes.
161. For a discussion of that structure see II (B) (3), supra.
162. This is true of the Councils in previous commodity agreements. See text
accompanying note 97, supra.
163. The huge amounts of capital that will be necessary just to meet projected
increases in petroleum demand for the 1970's are documented in OECD, supra note
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Second, while disputes that cannot be settled by the disputants
should be referred to the Council, decisions made by the Council
should be appealable to a third-party arbitrator outside of the agree-
ment."4
Third, in terms of amendment, the Council should be endowed
with powers similar to those of Councils in past agreements, 1 5 with
one exception: rather than leaving the amendment of petroleum
prices exclusively to the discretion of the Council, the agreement
should contain an escalator clause linking petroleum prices to an
index of world inflation, ' as well as a provision for the automatic
adjustment of prices in case of a revaluation of the currency in which
the prices are articulated. 7
Fourth, the Council should be empowered to levy a tax on mem-
ber's petroleum transactions,"" and to apply the proceeds of this tax
12, at 18, 157. Jahangir Amuzegar has suggested that surplus petrodollars could be
invested to provide this capital. Amuzegar, supra note 1, at 688.
164. This is unlike what has hitherto been true. See text accompanying note 100,
supra. ". . . The interpretation of treaties is essentially a judicial process, and, in any
case, the neutral and presumably unprejudiced judge or arbitrator, more than any
other organ or agency of the interested parties, is likely to arrive at a fair and unbiased
interpretation." HARVARD RESEARCH, THE LAW OF TREATIES 973 (1938).
165. See text accompanying note 106, supra.
166. The inclusion of such an escalator clause in an international commodity
agreement would be unprecedented, and would mark a great advance for exporting
countries over the systems for price adjustment previously used. See note 106, supra.
The escalator clause, first advocated by Iran, would guarantee the exporting countries
a stable real level of revenues notwithstanding continued inflation in the industrialized
importing countries by linking the world price of petroleum to an index of some twenty
or thirty other basic commodities and manufactured products needed by OPEC mem-
bers. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1974, at 18, col. 1. Such a system, endorsed by the
communique issued by OPEC leaders after their March meeting, would make the
petroleum commodity agreement a viable mechanism even in times of world inflation.
167. This clause would go beyond art. 42 of the Cocoa Agreement and art. 29 of
the Tin Agreement (discussed in note 107, supra) by making the adjustment auto-
matic, rather than leaving it to the Council's discretion. Such a clause would not be
entirely unprecedented in the field of petroleum agreements, for a December 1971
agreement between the international oil companies and the member countries of
OPEC called for a "real price" for petroleum based on "stable dollars" free from
exchange fluctuations. Amuzegar, supra note 1, at 683.
168. The concept of an international tax on petroleum was first advocated by
Boris Swerling, who wrote in 1962:
Conceivably the U.N. might be empowered to impose an interna-
tional tax per barrel of petroleum produced. Why petroleum? A tax on
any one commodity is necessarily open to objections, but petroleum is
peculiarly well suited to provide a broad tax base. It is now the most
important single commodity on the internationally-traded list; consump-
tion of energy in general and petroleum in particular is closely correlated
with level of industrial activity; and practically no country is entirely
dissociated from it, either as producer or as consumer . . . . Because the
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to one of three purposes (or any combination thereof): (1) to provide
long-term, low-interest loans to importing countries unable to meet
their petroleum import bills;169 (2) to promote the development of new
energy resources; and (3) to provide developmental loans for member
countries.'17
6. Variations within a Commodity, Processed Products, and
Substitute Products
An international petroleum agreement, like the current world
physical quantities involved are so enormous, the per-unit tax rate would
be quite nominal, and the marginal choice between alternative fuels very
little affected. A vigorous growth trend is built in, so that rising availabil-
ity of international funds would be provided for in the future . . . . In
modem tax systems, the contribution of commodity levies is trivial as
compared with direct taxation of personal and business income, but any
international fiscal system must begin on a more primitive level.
However the incidence of the tax might be shared as between produ-
cer and consumer, the principle would be established that this key raw
material makes a special contribution to the international community
and, similarly that the international community has a clear interest in
the rational management of petroleum resources. At this stage the pro-
posal may appear to be of strictly academic interest. But the organiza-
tional basis of the world petroleum industry is in a state of flux. One can
be sure only that past arrangements are a poor guide to the needs of the
future.
Swerling, Current Issues in Commodity Policy, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
16-17 (1962).
While past commodity agreements have permitted their Council to levy a tax (see
text accompanying note 109, supra), the tax has been on members' commodity trans-
actions as opposed to the tax on commodity production proposed by Mr. Swerling. The
difference is significant, for while the former tax may hardly touch a major petroleum-
consuming country which is virtually self-sufficient, the latter tax would affect it
substantially. That past agreements have relied on a tax on commodity transactions,
rather than on the more inclusive tax on production, probably reflects both a reluct-
ance on the part of member countries to subject any more of their activities than was
absolutely necessary to the supervision of an international authority and the miscon-
ception that that commodity activity which does not cross national boundaries does
not constitute part of a commodity's world trade.
Regardless of which option is selected, however, the tax should be designed so as
to fall on those countries that have excess revenues available which could be used for
the purposes suggested in the text. It may thus be necessary to provide a rebate system
for those petroleum-producing or petroleum-exporting countries which, because of
factors such as their large populations and corresponding developmental needs, do not
have surplus liquid funds.
169. The use of the tax for this purpose would supplement the efforts now in
progress to help these countries, such as the "oil facility" established within the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. N.Y. Times, May 7, 1974, at 63, col. 8.
170. While past commodity agreements have had no direct analogue to the aid
suggested here, both the Diversification Fund of the Coffee Agreement (mentioned in
note 110, supra) and the Hardship Fund of the Sugar Agreement (see text accompany-
ing note 112, supra) contain similar overtones.
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petroleum pricing system, would have to establish different crude
petroleum prices depending upon the quality of the crude and the
distance from the point of origin to major consumer markets. Like
past commodity agreements,' 7 the petroleum agreement should leave
the type of crude petroleum to be exported to the exporting country's
discretion, with power for the Council to modify members' quotas
should demand for a particular type of crude outstrip supply.
The agreement should not seek to establish prices for refined
petroleum products, because of the enormous complexity of such an
effort; but it should rather provide that the prices of these products
should be consistent with those of crude petroleum, with an arbitra-
tion provision for any disputes that may arise.'" In addition, pro-
cessed product exports should be included in a member's quota.'"
The agreement should not attempt to cover alternative forms of
energy, for while a comprehensive world energy policy would encom-
pass those forms, conclusion of an agreement dedicated to petroleum
alone would in itself represent a formidable task. Any efforts to coor-
dinate developments in the various alternative forms of energy should
be left to the discretion of the Council, at least pending the succesful
conclusion and temporary operation of an international petroleum
agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
An international petroleum agreement can be drafted which
would meet the needs of participating countries. For the exporting
countries, such an agreement would mean a stable price and income
from their petroleum, access to importing country markets for their
refined products, and possibly, a reduction in the world consumption
of their petroleum. For the importing countries, the agreement would
mean a guaranteed supply of petroleum at stable prices, and possi-
bly, increased economic aid to those countries unable to meet their
petroleum import bill. For both sides, the agreement would represent
the coordination of efforts to develop alternative energy sources, the
harmonization of governmental measures governing the behavior of
the international oil companies, and enhanced stability of the world
petroleum market.
While such an agreement would derive its inspiration and many
of its provisions from past commodity agreements, it would also in-
corporate innovative approaches to the regulation of an international
commodity market. These approaches might then be adopted in sub-
171. See text accompanying note 120, supra.
172. This provision could be patterned on art. 44 of the Coffee Agreement, dis-
cussed in note 103, supra.
173. They have been in past agreements. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
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sequent agreements for other commodities, and thereby serve to in-
ject new life into the commodity agreement as a vehicle for the inter-
national supervision of world trade.
Various new approaches, including the provisions that lower the
trade barriers of importing countries and the proposed measures lim-
iting the growth in the world consumption of petroleum, would repre-
sent a shift in the international petroleum agreement toward a more
equalized allocation of duties and away from the traditional, imbal-
anced distribution of obligations among importing and exporting
members. This shift would reflect a different perspective toward the
international petroleum agreement than appears to have been true of
past commodity agreements, a perspective recognizing that both the
importing and exporting countries, not just the latter, stand to bene-
fit substantially from the conclusion and operation of a commodity
agreement.

